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These are the numbers the protocol actually runs on. They are not illustrative and they are not rounded for a slide. Each one appears in params/parameters.json in the contracts repository, in the Solidity constants of the HyperEVM contracts, and in the table below. A script in CI compares them and fails the build if any disagree. A guardrail that exists in one place and not another is not a guardrail.
The launch value is what a listing is approved with by default. The hard guardrail is the bound written into the contract: governance may tune a listing within it and can never exceed it. A fully compromised multisig still cannot set a 100% performance fee and drain every vault through the fee path.

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Economics

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Risk limits

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Bonding

Bonds are posted in USDC. Ceilings are per builder across every listing they own, not per listing — a builder able to defraud across three agents is exposed for the total, not for each one separately. Tier 0 is unbonded and may hold no capital at all.

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Timing and limits

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What is deliberately absent

There is no management fee, and there is not going to be one. It is not a field in any contract. A fee on capital under management pays a builder for holding a trader’s money rather than for making it grow, which is the opposite of the incentive this marketplace exists to create. The execution fee is not a management fee in disguise. It is charged on notional that actually traded, so a vault sitting idle pays nothing however long it sits idle. It does create an incentive the performance fee does not — a builder earns on turnover whether or not the turnover made money — and three things hold that in check:
  • Agents are ranked on net-of-fee returns, so a strategy that trades its way to a worse outcome for the trader ranks worse.
  • Turnover is shown on every listing, next to the return.
  • A listing whose fees exceed its gross profit over thirty days is flagged automatically, and may be paused.
There is no listing fee at launch. The field exists and is capped at 500 bps, but it is set to zero. A builder pays nothing to list; they earn when their agent earns.

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Bonds are in USDC, not $AGENT

A bond denominated in a token the platform issues is a bond whose value the platform controls — and whose value is likeliest to collapse in exactly the scenario where harmed traders need to be made whole. Bonds are posted in USDC for that reason. Staked AGENTmaylatersubstituteforpartoftheUSDCbond,cappedathalf,sothatatminimumhalfthedeterrentstaysinanassetnobodyherecanprint.Thatmechanismshipsdisabled,andAGENT may later substitute for part of the USDC bond, capped at half, so that at minimum half the deterrent stays in an asset nobody here can print. That mechanism ships disabled, and AGENT does not exist yet.

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Slashing is a human decision

The slash split is enforced by the contract. The decision to slash is not. Most real misconduct — wash trading, coordinated manipulation, self-dealing — is not mechanically provable on-chain. Slashing is executed by the governance multisig with published rationale. This is not trustless slashing and is not described as such anywhere it matters. What the contract does guarantee is where a slashed bond goes: 70% to harmed traders, never 100% to the treasury, because a treasury that keeps the whole slash has an incentive to find reasons to slash.
Traders can set stricter limits than a listing’s defaults on their own vault, never looser. Tightening is always available; loosening past what the listing was vetted at would void the guarantee the leaderboard makes to everybody else.